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Abstract
Whether the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector leads to a decline
(increase) on wage growth is theoretically ambiguous given that the outcome depends
on the uncertain interaction between firms’ and workers’ behaviour. Using propensity
matching techniques, this paper investigates the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in the
Portuguese banking industry. The empirical results obtained from Quadros de Pessoal
for the period between 1989 and 1997, clearly confirm a positive relationship between
wage variation and timing of economic restructuring for either men or women retained
in the firm. Moreover, the results show that privatisation hit more intensely the most
educated, experienced (oldest) and the best paid workforce irrespective of the gender.
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1 Introduction
Despite the large and prolific literature on privatisation, the analysis of the causal eﬀect
of privatisation on wages remains almost neglected.1 This is somewhat surprising as the
transfer of ownership rights to the private sector has been the most notable structural reform
introduced worldwide in the provision of public goods and services.2 More importantly, its
implementation has frequently been met with fierce resistance from both labour unions and
local communities and attracted intensive press attention. Whilst policy-makers endlessly
advocate gains in terms of firm’s internal eﬃciency and profitability, labour unions fear
adverse workforce adjustments including either displacement of jobs or reductions in pensions
or wages, as a result of the restructuring process. Perhaps the lack of empirical research on
this controversial topic merely reflects the unavailability of appropriate data. Prototypical
research on privatisation uses data from firms’ annual accountancy reports, which at the
best, contain crude labour force information.
On the other hand, at the theoretical level the relationship between privatisation and
labour market outcomes is not obvious: privatisation does not necessarily cut jobs or lower
wages. Employment and wages may decline as privatisation implies a shift in the public firms’
objective function towards profit maximisation and a reduction of union bargaining power.
But if workers are willing to put in more eﬀort after privatisation, then firms may settle
for higher wages (see for instance, Goerke (1998), De Fraja (1993), Haskel and Szymansky
1Some notable exceptions include Brainerd (2002), Haskel and Szymansky (1993), Ho et al. (2002),
La Porta and Silanes (1999), Monteiro (2002), Parker and Martin (1996) and Peoples and Talley (2001).
Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the empirical literature on privatisation.
2Megginson et al. (1994) provide an excellent historical overview of postwar privatisations.
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(1992) or Haskel and Sanchis (1995)). Similarly, if new ownership brings fresh capital and
expertise, such changes are likely to generate growth and job creation.
This paper contributes to this discussion, by implementing a variety of increasingly pop-
ular nonexperimental methods, labelled propensity matching estimators, to assess the impact
of privatisation on wages. In particular, this study re-visits the eﬀects of privatisation in the
Portuguese banking industry, where the already accomplished reform is considered a “valu-
able experience for other countries”, since “the main reform objectives were met” without
“the concomitant financial instability experienced by many OECD countries”(See OECD,
1999, page 64). In this way, this study also contributes to the long-standing debate in the
literature, until now almost exclusively confined to the evaluation of active labour market
policies, over whether treatment eﬀects in observational studies can be reliably evaluated
without a randomised experiment. This study is empirically fruitful for several reasons.
First, apart from the remarkable success of the already aforementioned policy in the bank-
ing sector, the design of the privatisation programme in this industry provides a promising
opportunity for examining the eﬀects of a change in ownership. Indeed, privatisation not
only did not aﬀect all public firms (there is still a large state-owned group) but also took
place continuously over eight years. Hence, this partial and ongoing privatisation design
permits us to pair individuals both in the same labour market and with common public
employment status. Therefore, we avoid the potential bias resulting from labour market
mismatch (Heckman et al., 1998) commonly observed in observational studies and the self-
selection bias inherent in the classical model of Heckman (1979) in the context of private
and public sectors.
Second, the adoption of propensity matching estimators is also economically appealing
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for analysing the impacts of privatisation. In fact, as privatisation is likely to cause dis-
proportionate changes in the composition of the workforce in privatised firms compared to
public firms, we would prefer a strategy robust to this unequal employment composition
variation. Because matching consists of ex post re-establishment of the conditions of an
experiment (where the treatment and control groups are statistically equal in every respect
except treatment status) by pairing each programme participant, according to observable
attributes, with members of a comparison or non-treated group, this eﬀect is naturally con-
trolled. Besides, matching is a flexible approach that avoids definition of a specific form for
either the outcome equation, decision process or the unobservable term.
On the other hand, this class of estimators is also appropriate to appraise the eﬀects of the
reform over both the short and long run. Indeed, the original cross-section pairwise matching
estimators have been recently extended not only to new multiple matching schemes, but also
to the case of repeated cross-sectional or longitudinal data (Heckman et al., 1997). These
new modified versions, which will be described below, are less restrictive in assumptions
and thus can produce more accurate estimates.3 The original matching assumptions are
well suitable for short-run eﬀects of treatment whereas these new extensions are likely to
become more plausible as we attempt to pick up more persistent medium-long term eﬀects
of privatisation. Discrepancies across the various estimators are informative in pinpointing
which assumptions are reasonable in each time period of analysis.
Finally, this class of estimators has heavy data requirements since the quality of matching
estimates mirrors the quality/quantity of the variables employed. This paper uses data from
3For details see the original papers of Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) or the discussions in Smith and Todd
(2000) and Blundell and Dias (2002), for instance.
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a large dataset, Quadros de Pessoal, collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and
Solidarity. This extensive matched employer-employee database provides detailed informa-
tion about each unit, firm or individual, during the period before and after the privatisation.
Hence, it allows us to draw samples of diﬀerent nature (cross-section and longitudinal) and
then, implement all the entire class of matching estimators. Moreover, as all treated and
control units respond to the same mandatory employer report, there is no bias resulting from
diﬀerences in survey questionnaires (Heckman et al., 1998).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Next Section 2 discusses briefly the main
features of the privatisation process and the labour relations prevailing in the Portuguese
banking sector. Section 3 presents an overview of the assumptions and variety of thematching
estimators. The data implementation issues are addressed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines
and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 closes the paper summarising the main lessons
of this study.
2 Privatisation and the Portuguese banking labour market
The privatisation program was introduced in the banking sector, as a further step in the
successful reform of the Portuguese financial system (OECD, 1999). This structural reform,
starting in 1984, aimed to put an end to the heavily regulated and nationalised system im-
posed in the industry after the 25th April 1974 revolution. Less than one decade afterwards,
when most of the deregulation reforms were already accomplished, including the dismantle-
ment of the interest rate controls and the openness of the financial intermediation to the
private sector, the privatisation program was then implemented.
The first privatisation law adopted in 1988 (law 84/88 from 20th July) allowed merely
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partial privatisation of public enterprises as the State still retained 51 per cent of the equity.
For this first phase of privatisation, the government selected four profitable firms, which
included one medium size bank. In April 1990, after a second Constitutional Amendment
laid down in June 1989, the lei Quadro das Privatizações, (decree-law 11/90 from 5thApril)
was passed allowing full privatisation of enterprises nationalised after 1974. The privatisation
program was assumed to be an important mechanism for (1) improving the deteriorated
performance of public economic units, (2) modernising and increasing their competitiveness
and (3) widening the participation of Portuguese citizens in the ownership of enterprises,
particularly among workers and small shareholders.4
The firms being privatised were first transformed into corporations, with a prior evalu-
ation being made by two independent entities. But in contrast with some other economic
sectors, (for instance, electricity and telecommunications) the government opted for a policy
of no interfering in the public firms during the period before privatisation (Naumann, 1995
and Sousa and Cruz, 1995), leaving the economic restructuring for future private owners. In
terms of scheduled order of privatisation, apart those firms which were selected on grounds
of performance indicators for the partial privatisation phase (OECD, 1989), there was no
firm schedule for subsequent firms’ privatisation (OECD, 1991). Instead, the timetable was
strongly aﬀected by the economic and political domestic cycles’ and by the international
context.
By mid1997, ten out of twelve public banks became fully private: two banks were priva-
tised in 1991, three in 1994, and each of the five remaining banks were privatised in 1989,
4Sousa and Cruz (1995) describe and discuss the economic and financial situation of public enterprises.
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1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996, respectively.5 , 6 The most common privatisation procedure used,
was public oﬀer, and to a much less extent, direct sale or public tender. The broadening
share-ownership goal clearly desired by the authorities was not achieved, instead a manager-
ial dominant type of ownership emerged (although the employees had the right to subscribe
to some part of the capital of the privatised firm at preferential rates). In most cases, own-
ership returned to former Portuguese groups, which owned them prior to the nationalisation
wave in 1974.7 Due to this private-public-private ownership path, privatisation in Portugal
is termed re-privatisation.
As a result of the divestiture reform, significant improvements in terms of productivity
and eﬃciency levels were registered in the Portuguese banking industry. For instance, the
OECD 1999 survey, referring to the commercial banking industry, reports a continuous
increase in the productivity level (balance sheet total per employee), which allowed not
only a reduction in operate/staﬀ costs (from 1.53 per cent of average assets in 1991 to
0.98 percent in 1997) but also a remarkable improvement in the profitability rate (return to
equity) after 1995). This global rise in the eﬃciency level of the industry is also confirmed by
Pinho (1999), who nevertheless attests to an increase that is particularly more pronounced
among privatised institutions. In terms of labour outcomes, the main economic restructuring
adjustments’ are illustrated in Table 1. For comparison purposes, the public category refers
to the 2 permanent public banks whereas the privatised category includes the 10 firms being
5This total number (ten) of firms privatised in the banking industry does not coincide with the eleven
privatised firms reported by the OECD 1999 survey. This discrepancy is due to both the absence of one bank
in the data, the exclusion of a bank, whose privatisation implied the transfer of a minority participation
(15 %) to the private sector and the inclusion of the indirect privatisation of a public bank through the
privatisation of the group to which it belongs (see page 22, Ministério das Finanças, 1999).
6According to the privatisation literature, the date of first tranche sell of each firm is considered the date
of eﬀective privatisation.
7International investors could buy a limited share of the equity ranging from two to forty percent of sales.
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privatised.
In contrast with public firms whose level of employment remained fairly constant from
1991 on, the level of employment in privatised firms dropped steadily during the reform
period. Each privatised firm lost on average 732 employees between 1989 and 1997 (implying
a 23 per cent (3884/3152) rate of overstaﬃng), which corresponds to a loss of 92 employees
per firm/year during the same period. This is further confirmed by the increasing number
of workers, particularly women, declared unemployed from the financial industry over the
referred period despite the absence of any failure or closing institution. Nevertheless, in
terms of job security, at least when measured by the share of permanent full time workers,
there was no deterioration in privatised firms once this proportion increased during the entire
period of analysis.8
The trend in banking workers’s wage is also clear: both public and privatised firms’
workers experienced a strong (real) wage rise, mainly reflecting the fast economic growth
observed in the economy, after Portuguese membership of the European Community in
1986. For privatised firms’ workers however, the wage increase is slightly more pronounced
(33 percent) than in public firms (27 percent), implying vis-a-vis, a positive privatisation
impact on the wage level. On the other side, the rise in the wage dispersion in privatised
firms, when measured by the standard deviation of hourly wage, may suggest heterogeneous
privatisation wage impacts. Notice that this simple analysis besides not accounting for
changes in the workforce composition, ignores the time elapsed since the introduction of the
8In some cases, the corporate economic restructuring involves the adoption of less secure job (human
resource) practices, including either temporary or partial employment, in order to achieve more flexible
industrial relations. Cam (1999), for example, reports significant jumps in the number of temporary posts
in the Turkish cement industry.
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reform in each firm, which possibly mitigates dynamic privatisation eﬀects.
In general, the new firm’s profit orientation is likely to exert a downward pressure on
wages and hence, erode the existent worker rents (Vieira et al., 1997) owed to regula-
tion/nationalisation waves’. Nevertheless, the scope for this wage erosion is limited, as
unions in the banking industry represent all of the workforce in the wage bargaining process,
regardless of the ownership of the bank. Moreover, the union bargaining position in the this
industry (historically the largest and most influential in the country) has been reinforced
over the course of reforms, in contrast with other sectors in the UK and USA, which were
exposed to similar market oriented policies (privatisation/deregulation).9 Indeed, the union
participation rate in the banking sector has expanded markedly between the period 1974-78
and 1991-95, from 71% to 106% (Cerdeira, 1997). A priori, the decentralised bargaining
system should bring uniform wage levels across firms within the banking sector, although
the positive diﬀerential between negotiated and eﬀective wage levels has widened since the
early nineties (Aperta et al., 1994).
3 Econometric considerations
Assessing the impact of privatisation on wages of workers, whose firm’s ownership was trans-
ferred from state to private hands, requires making an inference about the wages that would
have been observed had the privatisation program not been introduced. As one can not
observe the wage paid to each privatised firms’ employee in case the reform had not taken
place, the establishment of the casual eﬀect becomes a problem of inference with missing
9Peoples (1998) reports a decline in the unionisation density after liberalisation of either trucking, telecom-
munications or airlines industry in the USA. This result is also found in developing countries, for instance
in Turkey de-unionisation also accompanied privatisation reform (Cam, 1999).
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data.
To be precise, let us state formally this causal eﬀect. Denote by Wi1 and Wi0 the wage
paid to an individual i (outcome or variable response) conditional on the presence and
absence of treatment (privatisation), respectively. Di is a participation variable that identifies
whether employee i received “treatment”, i.e. was employed in a firm that was privatised,
(Di = 1) or not (Di = 0) . Finally, Xi represents for each individual i, a set of attributes,
variables such as gender or age, that are unaﬀected by the treatment under study. The
missing data problem arises because it is impossible to form the impact of the policy for
any i − th individual, 4i = Wi1 −Wi0, as the observed wage for an employee i is given by
Wi =Wi0+ Di (Wi1 −Wi0) with only one of Wi0 and Wi1 being observed at any given point
in time.10 For all those individuals treated, one is interested in estimating the most common
parameter in the evaluation literature, E (Wi1 −Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) , also referred as the eﬀect
of the treatment on the treated.
In social experiments, the evaluation problem is in principle solved, by virtue of random
assignment to participation, which guarantees that the potential outcomes are independent
of the assignment mechanisms, and then E (Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) = E (Wi0|Di = 0, Xi) .11 In
contrast, in observational studies, assignment is not random resulting either from individual
self-sorting, selection made by a program manager or both. Much of the evaluation literature
either on causal models in statistics or on selectivity models in econometrics, is devoted to
10We are implicitly adopting the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA) first expressed by Rubin
(1980). This assumption requires that an individual’s potential outcome is independent of the treatment
status of other individuals, ruling out any eventual within-group or spillover (general equilibrium) eﬀect.
11There are, however, several other problems, such as no perfect compliance with treatment (the absence
of non random drop-outs) associated with the experimental design that may plague randomised experiments
in social policy evaluation. See, inter alia, Heckman and Smith (1995) and Heckman et al. (2000), for
detailed discussions.
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finding the identifying assumptions that allow the estimation of E (Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) .
In matching, the fundamental assumption, Conditional IndependenceAssumption (CIA),
states that treatment assignment (Di) conditional on attributes (Xi), is independent of the
potential wages (Wi0,Wi1). In formal notation, this assumption corresponds to
(Wi0,Wi1) ⊥ Di | Xi, (1)
where⊥ denotes independence.12, 13 This means, that givenXi, one can use non-participants’
wages to approximate the (counterfactual) wage level of participants had they not partici-
pated.14 Hence, matching consists of looking for each treated observation, a set of non-treated
observations with the same realisation of Xi. In the language of Heckman and Robb (1985)
matching assumes that selection occurs only on observables. Therefore, CIA excludes the
familiar dependence between outcomes and participation that is central to econometric mod-
els of self selection: there are no important variables apart from Xi, on which the analyst
can not condition, that eﬀect both the non-treated outcome (Wi0) and assignment (Di). If
this were the case, then selection would be on unobservables.15 Moreover, this assumption
implies that individuals either do not participate in the program on the basis of potential
gains (Wi1 −Wi0) or that the analysts have as much information about the program being
12Ibems (2000) and Lechner (2001) generalise this simple framework to the case of multiple and alternative
treatment states.
13“Ignorable treatment assignment” in the terminology of Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
14More precisely, for estimating the eﬀect of the treatment on the treated, E (Wi1 −Wi0|Di = 1, Xi),
it is suﬃcient to fulfil a weaker version of CIA, W0 ⊥ Di | Xi and then E (Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) =
E (Wi0|Di = 0, Xi) .
15Note however, that if an extra additive separability condition holds on the outcome equations,
W0 = g0 (X) + U0 and W1 = g1 (X) + U1, CIA doesn’t imply a zero (unobservable) selection bias, this
is E (U0 | X,D = 1) = 0. Instead, matching as randomisation, balances the bias, E (U0 | X,D = 1) =
E (U0 | X,D = 0) = E (U0 | X) .
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studied as the agents entering into the program.
A practical implementation problem arises when the vector Xi is highly dimensional and
contains continuous variables. To circumvent this diﬃculty, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
show that matching on a scalar function of Xi, such as the propensity score, P (Xi) =
Pr (Di = 1|Xi) , the conditional probability of participation given the vector of observed
attributes, is suﬃcient to balance the covariates Xi between the treatment and control
units.16 Therefore, if CIA holds conditional on Xi, it will also hold conditional on the
propensity score,
(Wi0,Wi1) ⊥ Di | P (Xi) . (2)
In this case, in order to have empirical content matching also requires,
0 < P (Xi) = Pr (Di = 1|Xi) < 1.17 (3)
To satisfy this condition there must be both participants and non-participants for each
covariate of the vector Xi. Failure to satisfy this assumption restricts the analysis to the
region of support (all possible values of Xi) common to all treated and non-treated units and
the estimated treatment eﬀect has to be redefined as the mean treatment eﬀect for those
treated falling within the common region of support.
Under law of iterated expectations and assumptions (2) and (3), the eﬀect of treatment
16This result holds for a more general balancing score b (Xi) . Balancing score is a function of the observed
covariates Xi such that the conditional distribution of Xi given b (Xi) is the same for treated and control
units. Xi is the finest balancing score and the propensity score is the coarsest function of Xi that is a
balancing score. In practice, it is possible to match on some variables Xi and on the propensity score. See
for instance, Lechner (2002).
17This assumption together with CIA are the “strong ignorability treatment assignment conditions” in
the terminology of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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on treated can be expressed as follows,
E (Wi1 −Wi0|Di = 1, P (Xi))
= E (Wi1|Di = 1, P (Xi))−E (Wi0|Di = 1, P (Xi))
= EP (Xi) [E (Wi1|Di = 1, P (Xi))−E (Wi0|Di = 1, P (Xi)) |Di = 1]
= EP (Xi) [E (Wi1|Di = 1, P (Xi))−E (Wi0|Di = 0, P (Xi)) |Di = 1] ,
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of (P (Xi) |Di = 1) .
By construction, matching eliminates two of the three selection bias sources identified
by Heckman et al. (1998): the bias resulting from having diﬀerent ranges of Xi for treated
and control samples (comparing non-comparable individuals - failure of the common sup-
port condition) and the bias resulting from having diﬀerent distributions of Xi across their
common support (weighting comparable individuals incomparably). The remaining source
of bias, diﬀerences on unobservables across groups, are ruled out by matching assumptions.
Under matching assumptions, the eﬀect of treatment on treated is thus given by,
X
i∈D=1
ni
Ã
Yi1 −
X
j ∈D=0
NijYj0
!
, (4)
where Nij controls for the weight placed on each comparison observation j for individual i,
ni18 represents the eﬀective weight for the final treated sample and Yi1 and Yj0 stand now
for a generic outcome, for the treatment and comparison groups, respectively.
A variety of diﬀerent matching schemes are possible. Each scheme involves the definition
18This will tipically correspond to the size of the treatment group unless there are treated observations
unmatched.
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of a closeness criterion, a neighbourhood, and the selection of an appropriate weight func-
tion to associate the set of non-treated observations to each participant. For instance, the
neighbourhood may range from a singleton set (one-to-one matching: nearest neighbour or
within caliper) to a multiple set, eventually including all non-treated observations (n-nearest
neighbours, radius matching, stratification, kernel and local linear regression-based match-
ing).19 The choice relies on the trade-oﬀ between variance and bias associated with each
type of matching performed and the computational intensity allowed. In general, increasing
the neighbourhood or bandwidth to construct the counterfactual will reduce the variance
and increase the bias resulting from using on average more, but poorer matches. It will also
rise the computational burden.20
After choosing the non-participants neighbour(s) for each i individual treated, the next
step consists of selecting the weight function. The most common functions include the unity
(equal) weight(s) to the nearest person(s) and zero to the others, and kernel weights, which
downweight distant observations in terms of the propensity score. Silverman (1986) clarifies
several alternative kernel functions.
A final remark concerns performing matching with or without replacement that is, using
or not using the same comparison unit repeatedly in forming the comparison group. Similarly,
using more than once the same non-treated unit may improve matching quality (reducing
the bias) but it increases the variance.21 In any case, diﬀerences resulting from the use of
19See Heckman et al. (1999) and Smith and Todd (2000) for a detailed description of each of these
matching estimators.
20Using local linear weights enable a faster convergence rate at boundary points and better adaptation to
diﬀerent data densities (Heckman et al., 1997).
21Dehejia and Whaba (1998, 1999) do find that the performance of simple matching with replacement
very satisfactory when compared to more complex matching extensions or methods without replacement.
In a multiple programe matching framework, it is required the use of matching with replacement. See, for
instance, Sianesi (2001) and Lechner (2002).
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diﬀerent matching schemes, reflect the degree of overlap between treatment and comparison
groups in terms of propensity score.
Matching can also be performed after regression adjustment as proposed by Rubin
(1979) and formally derived by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), leading to the regression-
adjusted matching estimator. This estimator can be seen as a restricted version of the clas-
sical matching method once it imposes both additive separability and exclusion restrictions
(widely used in the econometric models of self selection) across outcome and participa-
tion equations. Additive separability condition is motivated in order to confine any bias
arising from the potential outcomes to a single “error term”. Exclusion restrictions are
adopted given the usual temporal discrepancy between enrolment and programme partici-
pation. Thus, the previous vector Xi can be split up into two groups of variables (Ri, Zi)
not necessarily mutually exclusive, where the subvector Ri determines the outcome equa-
tion, Wi0 = Riβ0 + Ui0, and the subvector Zi determines programme participation given
by P (Xi) = Pr (Di = 1|Xi) = Pr (Di = 1|Zi) = P (Zi) .22 Thus, instead of the CIA, the
regression adjusted estimator imposes
Ui0 =
h
Wi0 −Ribβ0i ⊥ Di | P (Zi) , (5)
implying that E (Ui0|Di = 0, P (Zi)) = E (Ui0 |Di = 1, P (Zi)) = E (Ui0 |P (Zi)). Now, in-
stead of assuming independence of the distribution of non-treated (treated) outcomes re-
22In contrast with the classical selection model, for which the identification conditions are well established
(see Heckman and Robb, 1985), the necessary and suﬃcient identification condition(s) for the regression
adjusted mathing estimator is(are) not clearly stated. However, despite the motivation of the exclusion
resctrition suggest that Zi + Ri, from the work done on the importance of number of conditioning variables
included both in the propensity score and outcome equation, it seems to suggest that Zi ⊇ or ⊂ Xi.
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garding participation provided one condition on X, one postulates that the distributions of
the unobservables are the same in treated and comparison groups, once one conditions on
P (Zi) . As Heckman et al. (1998) show, the main advantage of this matching version is
that it allows an improvement in the eﬃciency of the matching estimator by reducing its
asymptotic variance.23 In terms of implementation, the eﬀect of treatment in this restricted
matching version is given by (4) with Y1i =
³
W1i −Ribβ0´ and Y0i = ³W0i −Ribβ0´ .
In a repeated cross-section or panel context, it is still possible to implement another
version of the matching estimator due to Heckman et al. (1997) called nonparametric con-
ditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences. It results from an extension of the conventional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator by defining outcomes conditional on Xi and using non-(or
semi-)parametric methods to construct the diﬀerences. The critical identifying assumption,
the bias stability condition using Eichler and Lechner (2002) terminology, states that condi-
tional on Xi, the biases are the same on average in diﬀerent time periods before and after
the implementation of the program, so that diﬀerencing the diﬀerences between treated
and non-treated units eliminates the bias. Let t and t0 denote respectively, a time pe-
riod after and before the program, then the eﬀect of treatment on treated is identified if
E (W0t −W0t0|Xi, D = 1) = E (W0t −W0t0|Xi, D = 0) . Thus, the eﬀect of treatment under
bias stability assumption is given by (4) for Y1i = (W1it −W0it0) and Y0j = (W0jt −W0jt0) .
Compared to the original matching estimator, this new version is more robust once it
requires a weaker assumption that allows for an unobserved determinant of participation.
Hence, individuals’ participation may be based on their potential program outcomes as long
as the unobservability (individual and/or time-specific) rests on separable components of
23This new formulation may or not imply selection on unobservables. See details Heckman et al. (1998).
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the error term.24 Compared to pure DiD (Meyer, 1995), this estimator has the advantage of
being nonparametric, so that successful identification does not depend on specific functional
forms for the respective expectations.
If the additive separability and exclusion restrictions mentioned before, are fulfilled
in periods t and t0, then the assumption of the nonparametric conditional diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences becomes, E (U0t − U0t0|P (Zi) , Di = 1) = E (U0t − U0t0|P (Zi) , Di = 0) , lead-
ing to an analogous regression-adjusted nonparametric diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator.
In this restricted version, the eﬀect treatment of treated is now defined for
Y1i =
h³
W1it −Ritbβ0t´− ³W0it0 −Rit0bβ0t´i and Y0j = h³W0jt −Rjtbβ0t´− ³W0jt0 −Rjt0bβ0t´i .
All these three new versions may be combined with any matching scheme mentioned
previously. The choice again, relies on the computational burden and on the insurmountable
trade-oﬀ between bias and eﬃciency.
4 Data and empirical specifications
The empirical part of this study relies on the Quadros de Pessoal (QP). This is a particu-
larly large and informative data set collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour
and Solidarity since the early eighties. It consists of a matched employer-employee database
containing a high number of variables/concepts that meet international standards (see for
example BIT, 1980) about each unit, firm or employee, observed. For instance, for each
firm the data gives the location, level of employment, economic activity, type of manage-
24This assumption is consistent with the classic sample selection model.
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ment, total sales and social capital. Similarly, for each employee, usual and unusual human
capital variables, such as gender, level of schooling, tenure, promotion date, occupation,
full-time/part-time status, earnings, duration of work and mechanisms of wage bargaining,
among others are provided. This valuable dataset also includes an identification variable for
either the firm or employee observed, which allows us to follow each unit over time.
Before describing the methodology used in this study for creating the data sample and
the variables, let us state precisely the treatment eﬀect one is interested in, which will
condition the selection of treated and non-treated units. This study attempts to examine
the eﬀect(s) of privatisation on the wages of workers from the Portuguese banking industry
using all variants of matching strategies described in section 3. As the direct target of this
program is the firm itself and not the employees, one would ideally like to evaluate the
privatisation impact on those employees that either remained, joined or left the firm after
its privatisation.25 In this case, for the “joiner or leaver” employee, it would also be required
to know the reason for their moving in or out the firm, as the wage accepted by moving
individuals varies remarkably according to their employment status. This kind of information
is unfortunately unavailable in this dataset, which makes it diﬃcult to interpret the results
for these particular two groups. Further, if the employee became unemployed, self-employed
or employed by local/central authorities (civil servants), one will not know which, as these
organisations are not covered by this survey. In order to avoid these potential problems, this
study strictly focuses only the eﬀect(s) of privatisation on the wages for those employees that
remained in the same firm after its privatisation. Therefore, our treated units ( employees)
25This contrasts with the active labour market policies, in which both the policy and evaluation object
targets coincide.
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correspond to all individuals that both work in each public firm subject to privatisation
and retain their jobs after the implementation of the reform. To be more precise, let t0
and t denote two points in time, representing respectively one period before (pre-treatment)
and one after (post-treatment) the privatisation of a given public firm. Thus, the treated
group includes all individuals that work both in t0 and t for the firm being privatised. The
corresponding control or untreated group is composed of those workers employed in the
remaining public firms (not subject to privatisation) and that, similarly, kept their jobs
between t0 and t. This choice allows us to match participants with controls not only across
certain observable characteristics, but also by pre-treatment public employment status. Thus,
one follows the spirit in the evaluation of active labour markets, in which only individuals
with common labour market histories (employment) are matched.26 More importantly, the
selection of this particular control group enables us to bypass the self selection problem
inherent in the classical selection model of Heckman (1979) in the context of private and
public sectors, and then fully justify the plausibility/adequacy of matching assumptions in
the present evaluation. In fact, it has long been recognised that employment in the public
or private sector arises from an endogenous decision. Individuals sort themselves in either
sector according to their own (mostly unobserved) skills and preferences (in terms of level
of risk and complexity of the job, opportunity of internal promotion, quality of the working
conditions, etc.), making the public employees a non-random sample from all (working)
labour force. Because one is using information from the remaining public employees within
the same industry for appraising the eﬀects of privatisation, this unobservable component,
26Variables relating labour force status of treated individuals were found to be very significant (even more
than earnings) in explaining the participation decision in trainning programmes.
19
responsible for the bias, is automatically controlled for. The remaining diﬀerences in terms
of observable attributes among the public employees will be eliminated by using matching
methods.
In addition, note that the purpose of analysis is to compute the overall impact of pri-
vatisation in the banking sector and not firm by firm eﬀects. Consequently, the ten firm
privatisations’ need to be condensed into one “single privatisation”. The creation of the
data sample for estimation is a two step procedure. In the first step, for each firm being
privatised is assigned one pre-treatment t0 and post-treatment t points in time, and the re-
spective treated and non-treated individuals are extracted. The choice of t0 and t is driven
by economic considerations. Because the firms’ process of reactive restructuring occurred
mainly after the implementation of the reform, as referred to in section 2, t0 consists of a
single calendar year prior to privatisation. In particular, the conventional procedure of the
privatisation literature is followed, considering the calendar year of each firm privatisation,
the year 0. Therefore t0 = −1, corresponds to the calendar year prior to each privatisation
date. In contrast, for the post-treatment period, one allows privatisation eﬀects to vary over
time following Gupta et al.’s (2001) discussion. The post-treatment period ranges between
one and four years , t = 1, 2, 3 and 4, corresponding either to one, two, three or four cal-
endar years after each privatisation date.27 The second step consists of aggregating in each
t0 and t points in time, all treated and non-treated individuals of the respective ten firms
privatised using a moving window as shown in Kluve et al.(1999). As a result, all individuals
excluding those from the permanent public firms, are considered non-treated and treated at
27This postreatment period choice is also conditioned by the first merger wave in 1998 in banking industry,
which involved recently privitised firms.
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diﬀerent points in time.
The empirical analysis is based on prime-age individuals not yet subject to retirement.
Therefore, the sample is further restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 65 years ac-
cording to the definition of the vertical collective agreement prevailing in the industry. Apart
from these two requirements, only observations without complete demographic information
in t0 and t used for either for the matching algorithm or the outcome equation were dropped.
As the outcome variable, we use the logarithm of hourly wage constructed as the loga-
rithm of the sum of monthly base wage, plus the regular and irregular components of the
wage, payment indexed to tenure and overtime divided by normal and extra hours worked.28
Hourly wage is preferable to monthly wage because workers from privatised and public firms
experienced diﬀerent length of hours of work after the reform.29 In addition, wages were
converted to real terms (1998 prices) using the Consumer Price Index (IPC). Table 2 and 3
display some selected characteristics of the treated and untreated (potential control) groups
segmented by gender suitable for matching on each time period t = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Appendix
describes the data more fully and gives other summary statistics for our 4 samples.
When the time elapsed from the reform is controlled for striking diﬀerences emerge.
Looking at men (Table 2), the demographic variables indicate that the target treated group
is slightly less educated and in contrast with the previous analysis (Table 1), has a significant
lower fraction of full-time employees. Age and tenure are quite similar across the two groups
with the exception of those employees that prevail the longest time period within the firms.
In this case, target treated individuals tend to be older and more experienced than non target
28The hourly wage is constructed in the same way as the literature that uses the same dataset does. See,
inter alia, Vieira (2001).
29See Appendix for summary statistics.
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individuals. The diﬀerence in the payment level across groups mainly reflects the diﬀerence
in human capital attainment: privatised employees are paid at lower hourly wage than the
group of potential controls.
Inspection of women related figures (Table 3) shows a similar general picture. Target
women are again less educated than in the control group and represent a substantially lower
fraction of full time employees in the whole privatised firms set than in the control group.
The major diﬀerence is that target women are slightly younger and less experienced than
those working in the control group. Regarding the pay level outcome, the same pattern
arises for women with target women earning less than non target women.
A naive way to evaluate the impact of the reform would consist in constructing a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator obtained by diﬀerencing the diﬀerences between target
and non target groups in each of two time periods, t = −1 and t. The resulting diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates (expressed in Table 4) though rough, confirm the positive relationship
between wage variation and time period of restructuring for both men and women previously
detected. Men (women) would have experienced wage cuts of 5 and 7 (1 and 11) percent
after the first and second years post-reform which were followed up by gains of 9 (11) percent
obtained after 4 years post reform.
The next issue concerns the selection of conditioning variables to be included in Zi in
order to estimate the propensity score. In the evaluation of the traditional active labour
market policies, the selection of variables in the participation equation is easily conducted
by the eligibility requirement rules of each programme.30 In contrast, under privatisation
30Alternative methodological procedures have been used in the literature to specify the propensity score
function. For example, Heckman et al. (1998a) use, among the variables suggested by the theory, only those
that are significant at conventional levels and which increase the fraction of observations correctly predicted,
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programme, firms and not workers, were selected to be privatised, and the time-ranking
choice was based on objective firm performance indicators. This study assumes that the
firm’s performance is fully mirrored in the composition and observable quality of the work-
force. This may be justified on the grounds that state enterprises tend to be overstaﬀed
and pay excessive wages. Thus, finding individual(s) not under the reform similar to a given
treated observation, will allow us to identify the privatisation eﬀect on the treated.
The definition of the propensity score requires the inclusion of variables that can not be
potentially changed by the programme itself. Given that, we concentrates upon time constant
variables (such as, schooling, sex, region and privatisation date) and on time varying variables
that were not aﬀected by the programme itself (past experience and tenure). Firm attributes
and variables that could be changed by privatisation ( firm size, occupation, duration of work
and part time status) were not included in the propensity score.31 The inclusion of these
variables was further restricted, whenever necessary, in order to comply with diagnostic tests
for the propensity score, mainly the general misspecification test.32 In addition, following the
works of Eichler and Lechner (2002) or Heckman et al. (1998a), the monthly wage prior to
entering the programme was extremely significant and whenever it increased the prediction
rate it was included in the model.
Tables 5 reports the results of the probit regression of the propensity score for men and
women, respectively, where the binary outcome takes the value 1 if the employee works in
a privatised firm when t =1. Table 6 presents other specification tests for both propensity
while Eichler and Lechner (2002) adopt tests against heteroskedasticity, omitted variables, nonnormality and
general misspecification to define the propensity function.
31As treated and control firms were very similar in terms of size, we did not include this variable in the
propensity score.
32In two out of eight probit models estimated (for each gender and time period), the misspecification test
required the inclusion of variables potentially changeable by privatisation.
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scores.33
The estimation results show, unsurprisingly, that for both genders the conditional par-
ticipation probability declines slightly with potential experience (age - schooling - 5) and
increases with tenure. Employees with at least primary school have an increased probability
of working in privatised firms. In particular, male or female employees with 6, 9, 14 or 16
years of schooling are clearly more likely to work in a privatised firm. The coeﬃcients on the
dummy variables for regions and privatisation dates reflect the location and size of the banks
being privatised. Therefore, whereas living in Lisbon and North of the country increases the
probability of working in a privatised firm, living in islands reduces it.34 The coeﬃcients on
privatisation date are almost all negative, given that the years 1989 and 1994 correspond to
the privatisation date of the four largest banks in the industry.35
For the actual matching estimation we also require that the pool of potential controls to
which a given treated observation may be paired belong to the same year.36 By matching
within the year we remove explicitly any time specific unobservables not controlled for by the
propensity score and avoid that each individual being matched with him(her)self. This is the
matching analogy to the fixed eﬀects. Also notice that including this variable (privatisation
date) both in the propensity score and as additional matching variable amounts to increasing
the weight of this variable when forming the matches.
Finally, for the regression adjusted matching versions, the outcome wage equation is
33We estimated a separate participation probit model according to each gender and period of time. In
the Appendix we show the probit estimates and the specification tests for t = 2, 3, and 4.
34The variable region was excluded in the probit for women in order to comply with the misspecification
test.
35The year 1990 is missing in our data and no privatisation took place in 1995
36It is not possible to match within the same region-year. More detailed information is provided in the
Appendix.
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adjusted by the conventional variables used in the literature. In particular, we follow Vieira
(2001), including a vector of human capital variables, such as, education, experience and
experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, duration of work and indicator variables
aimed for controlling gender, part time status, occupation, region and privatisation calendar
time.
5 Impact estimates
As discussed in Section 3, diﬀerent matching schemes generate diﬀerent estimates. This
study adopts two extreme estimators in terms of neighbourhood size: the one-to-one nearest
neighbour estimator with replacement and the gaussian kernel estimator.37 Given the general
strong similarity between the results obtained with both these two strategies, in what follows
the nearest neighbour (NN) estimates are presented.38 The NN matching estimator, relative
to the gaussian estimator, has the advantage of being robust to the misweighted error due
to choice-based sample scheme (see detailed discussion in Smith and Todd, 2000).
The NN matching strategy succeeds in reducing the variability of the observable at-
tributes of both male and female workers in both groups. For instance, prior to matching,
the estimated average propensity score for women working and not working in privatised
firms during one year post-reform, were respectively, 0.46507 (standard deviation of 0.18510)
and 0.24290 (0.19689). After matching, the propensity score for the control group became
0.46505 with the standard error of 0.18505.
Table 7 reports the impact of privatisation on the logarithm of hourly wage for men,
37Given that the size of the treatment group in some cases is smaller than the control group size, matching
with replacement is the unique reasonable option.
38In occasional instances, whenever these two estimates diverge, the discrepancy will be explicitly noted.
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over four diﬀerent time periods, using four diﬀerent matching strategies. In the first two
rows, estimates from two versions of matching implemented in the context of cross section
samples are presented: simple matching and regression adjusted matching. In the last two
rows, these two same matching versions are reproduced under weaker assumptions using
longitudinal data. The pre-programme period for each privatised firm is given by t = −1
while the post-programme is given by t ranging between one and four years. For example,
the figure -.095 (first row, first column) indicates that during the first year post-reform, the
wage paid to retained men in privatised firms grew 9.1 percent (e−.095−1) less than the wage
paid to their respective counterparts in public firms.
The overall picture depicted in Table 7 and Figure 1, even though not reproducing exactly
the same magnitude of the impacts, broadly confirms the dynamics of the treatment eﬀects
formerly identified and explained in Monteiro (2002). Retained workers from privatised firms
initially experience wage growth losses (during the first two years post reform) corresponding
to a firm’s cost reducing strategy. After the third year post-reform, this pay strategy is
reversed once the remaining maintained workforce has to be better paid in order to equate
the wage level paid by public firms and thus reduce turnover.
The diﬀerence is that now, wage losses are marginally greater. For example, in the first
year the wage cut hovers between .081 and .103 log points whereas before it was .092. After 2
years post-reform, the existent gap between both estimates remains the same. The wage loss
now varies between .086 and .111 compared to the earlier estimate of .087. In particular,
notice the remarkable ability of the regression adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching
estimator in reproducing the same magnitude detected previously with the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator. During the period of (wage) recovery (four years after the introduction
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of the reform) an opposite pattern is found. All four matching strategies tend to underesti-
mate the wage growth gain that is formerly identified. In fact, the previous gain of 0.082 is
above of any matching estimates (ranging between -.048 and 0.077) produced.
A point worth noting concerns the performance of the four matching strategies imple-
mented. In fact, two diﬀerent patterns seem to emerge according to the time period of
analysis. During the first two years, similar estimates in terms of magnitude and signifi-
cance are obtained across the four matching versions. In contrast, considerable variation
(in terms of both sign and magnitude) is found among the estimates produced by the two
cross sectional matching versions for the latest time periods of analysis. This result possibly
indicates the implausibility of the cross section matching assumptions for analysing long
treatment eﬀects. Recall that in the case of a pure random experiment, diﬀerent method-
ological strategies would yield similar results within each time period. Therefore deviations
are seen as indicators of the presence of frailty or unreliable assumptions.
Turning now to the women, their respective impacts are reported in Table 8. As we can
infer from Table 8 or Figure 2, the overall pattern seems to deviate from the earlier findings.
Indeed, the former apparent U-shaped pattern between wage loss and time of restructuring
when using this specific control group, is now replaced by a positive relationship with the
strongest and negative eﬀects being felt during the first year after privatisation. As a result,
the divergence in magnitude of the eﬀects is now clearly pronounced. In the first year post-
reform the wage loss suﬀered is now more intense than formerly identified (.062 log points)
whereas after two years and in contrast to men, the intensity of the wage loss does decline
to a level below the .115 previously detected. In terms of wage gains, the same male trend
is observed with matching estimators underestimating the earlier estimate of .043. The
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major diﬀerence is that the longitudinal estimates loose their significance. Nevertheless the
corresponding kernel estimates diﬀer substantially reflecting a sparce overlapping level of the
propensity score. In fact, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences kernel matching estimate is .060 while
the respective regression adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimate is 0.011.
Finally, the dichotomy regarding the performance of the four matching strategies is also
perceived. Again, the same instable and erratic pattern of cross sectional matching esti-
mates is observed, suggesting that there is considerable selection on unobservables that is
contaminating the longer privatisation cross matching impacts.
We turn now to the question of identifying sources of heterogeneity other than gender
and timing for which privatisation eﬀects are most prominent. Therefore, Table 9 and
Table 10 report results obtained from one-to-one diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimates
for men and women respectively, for diﬀerent groups stratified according to age, tenure,
education, occupation, full time status, position on the wage disribution and macroeconomic
environment involving privatisation.39
It turns out that consideration of a single privatisation eﬀect per time period masks a
great deal the variation of privatisation eﬀects. Nevertheless, although significant diﬀerences
across and within skill groups arise from these two tables, a fairly similar trend can be
detected for most skill groups regardless of the gender. In fact, the same positive relation-
ship (sometimes resembling a U-shaped pattern) of wage adjustment previously identified, is
now clearly exhibited for both men and women for the sub-categories of age, tenure, educa-
tion, occupation, it is also present but less clear for employment status and economic cycle
39The following partition (into diﬀerent subcategories) is somewhat arbitrary as we seek to have significant
estimates within each sub-group.
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breakdowns. The positive adjustment, though somewhat wavy, is also evident in diﬀerent
positions (quartiles) of the wage distribution for both genders. Figure 3 and Figure 4 help
to uncover these trends.
Starting with age, the results seem to penalise relatively more the oldest employees of
both genders. In fact, employees aged more than 50 years, experienced a significant wage cut
(around 13 percent) during the first two years, clearly more pronounced than the average of
the respective gender group within each time period. This is not particularly surprising as
the prospect of this age-group for nearly retirement is significantly high. On the other hand,
whereas compulsory wage promotions are defined for the initial years of the career (for low-
and medium-paid occupations) by the wage agreement contract, these are optional for the
latest years of the career and for the highest paid occupations within the firm. Hence, it is
understandable that firms prefer to cut labour costs on the oldest individuals. This same
reason explains why the highest wage increase occur for the youngest working group (both
males and females).
Evidence on tenure subgroups also reflects this restricted firm’s freedom to set wages for
certain experienced groups. Individuals who remained the longest time within the firm suf-
fered the highest wage losses over a longer time period. At the same time younger individuals
enjoyed necessary the highest wage gains.
Looking at educational breakdowns, a surprising result is displayed. In contrast with
our expectation, the best (and not the least) educated male and female employees are the
most hit workforce, suﬀering sharp and lasting reductions (which are never reversed) in their
relative wages in particular after two years of the implementation of the reform. A possible
explanation for this finding might rely on the unknown size of the noncash component of
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compensation paid to this group. Given tax allowances firms might have preferred to reduce
their relative wage and allow employees to still enjoy fat nonwage compensation, such as free
car. In contrast, the wage gains are fairly similar across diﬀerent educational groups and
gender.
In what concerns occupational sub-categories, both Tables 9 and 10 indicate that pri-
vatisation eroded far more the relative wages of those employees (either men or women) in
the highest (managers) and lowest (unskilled) occupations within the firm.40 Yet in contrast
with the latter group (in particular unskilled men) whose relative pay recovers significantly
later on, the former group (both male and female in managerial/professional positions) in-
curs larger and longer lasting wage losses. Hence, despite the broad concept of managers
used here, this result seems to contradict the positive prediction (from a variety of theories)
of the impacts of privatisation on CEO pay level.41 The reasoning for this finding is likely to
be related to the downsizing strategy followed by privatised firms possibly implying a lower
level of supervision and responsibilities for employees in this occupation.
The negative privatisation eﬀects between part and full-time female employees diﬀer
mainly in terms of the timing of occurrence with wage cuts being more pronounced in the
first year (two years) for the full-time (part-time) workers. On the other hand, wage gains
are felt only by male part-time workers. The unexpected extreme wage jump for this group
possibility arises from their insecure and risky position in the labour market before the
reform took place. Therefore, the compensation of part-time workers could reflect their
harder involvement (eﬀort) in their job after the introduction of the reform. The significant
40These two occupations have been enjoying (at least in 1991) the widenest gap between negotiated and
eﬀective wages (see Aperta et al., 1994).
41See Rosen (1992) or Wolfram (1998) for a theoretical and empirical survey on the executive pay.
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reduction of the part-time employees ratio from 33% to 7.9% between t=-1 and t=4 may
further reinforce this explanation.
The partition based on the position of the wage distribution summarises all previous
eﬀects. The most skilled and well-paid employees (both genders) before the reform, who
were probably the most highly educated and experienced endured to a far greater degree the
greater and longer-lasting losses, while the remaining workers were able to enjoy later some
benefits from the reform. For women, however, the least skilled also experienced a wage loss
similar to the most highly skilled during the first year.
Finally, note the unsurprising change on the wage adjustment pattern over recessive
macroeconomic environments. In fact, for both genders, the positive relationship is now
replaced by an inverted U-shaped wage adjustment pattern, reflecting more urgency on the
restructuring process.
6 Concluding Remarks
The causal eﬀect of privatisation on wages remains an important and controversial topic
amongst policy-makers, economists and econometricians. Among policy-makers significant
interest persists since the implementation of this reform has typically been contested by pub-
lic opinion and labour unions. The usual resistance arises from the likely adoption of adverse
contained labour cost strategies, including both displacement and wages reductions, despite
the lack of empirical evidence supporting this last claim. For economists, additional interest
results from the commonly ambiguous predictions proceeding from diﬀerent theoretical ap-
proaches to the impact of privatisation on wages. Among econometricians, the discussion is
centred on the habitual missing data problem inherent in the evaluation of causal eﬀects in
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observational studies. In contrast with active labour market policies, privatisation has not
been the target of a lively discussion from an evaluation standpoint and therefore deserves
further scrutiny.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in the
Portuguese banking industry. In particular, we were interested in testing if earlier findings
on privatisation wage eﬀects’ are robust to the methodology selection. Following earlier
analysis, the underlying complexity arising from employment adjustments is again simplified
by strictly focusing on the wage eﬀects on those employees who remained within the firm
after the reform. One then implements the four variants of matching estimators to address
the issue. Because we are interested in the eﬀects over the course of diﬀerent time periods
(hovering between one and four years after privatisation) and because the data set used
is rich enough to allow us to extract samples of diﬀerent nature (both cross section and
longitudinal) for each time period, we is also able to test the assumptions reasonableness’ of
diﬀerent matching estimators in each time period.
In general, the results point to an overall confirmation of previous findings. Indeed, the
same general positive relationship between wage variation and time of restructuring is again
observed for both men and women. For women, however, this pattern deviates slightly from
prior evidence, since formerly the strongest privatisation impact occurs after two years of
privatisation. When the wage eﬀects are broken down to account for the heterogeneity of
the eﬀects, a persistent positive pattern prevails irrespective of the gender. The evidence
provided here also shows that the restructuring process hit more intensively the most ed-
ucated employees. This surprising result, which contrasts with the conventional wisdom
from the public/private wage literature, may imply that instead of education, seniority and
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experience are much more valuable and count for much in this particular labour market.
On the other side, a dichotomous pattern regarding the performance of the four matching
strategies emerges. Whereas in short term analysis, a clear similarity emanates across the
four matching estimators, an instable and erratic pattern among only cross section match-
ing estimates is observed in long term analysis. This result hence suggests that there is
considerable selection on unobservables that is contaminating the longer privatisation cross
matching impacts.
In terms of the policy agenda, the evidence gathered here has two important implications.
First, privatisation seems to be a gender neutral policy given the strong similarity between
the eﬀects by gender either in terms of trend or intensity. Thus this result appears to
contradict Gary Becker’s prediction about the relationship between market structure and
discrimination. Nevertheless, more research is clearly needed to assess if women are or not
actually relatively worse oﬀ than men after privatisation. Second, the evidence presented
so far also shows that the wage cuts threat so argued by labour unions to the remaining
workforce is unfounded. Indeed, wage losses if they occur are only temporary as the long
term dynamics presented here seem to be in favour of the law of one price in the labour
market.
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Table 1: Employment and wage levels during the privatisation period
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Average employment
Public 7 323 6 771 6 812 6 793 6 856
Privatised 3 884 3 733 3 663 3 425 3 152
Full time status %
Public 89.1 91.5 95.2 98.0 98.5
Privatised 83.3 98.5 96.3 98.4 98.7
Average of log of real hourly wage
Public 7.22
(.328)
7.37
(.372)
7.46
(.360)
7.54
(.326)
7.49
(.328)
Privatised 7.12
(.354)
7.23
(.361)
7.36
(.411)
7.44
(.365)
7.45
(.368)
Number of unemployed people from the financial sector
Women 1 400 3 400 5 800 8 600 8 700
Total 3 100 5 700 12 000 18 300 16 200
Source: Own computations based on Quadros de Pessoal, MSST (1989-1997) and INE (Inquérito ao Emprego - 4otrimestre).
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Figure 1: Matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on the hourly wage of men
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Figure 2: Matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on the hourly wage of women
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Figure 3: The impact of privatisation on the hourly wage by gender, across age, tenure,
education and occupation groups
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Figure 4: The impact of privatisation on the hourly wage by gender, across employment
status, position in the wage distribution and economic cycle
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Table 2: Mean attributes for the potential control and treated male groups in time period t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat.
Demographic variables*
Age 43.4 43.5 43.4 43.0 42.6 42.6 39.7 40.9
Education 9.7 9.2 9.7 9.2 10.0 9.3 10.1 9.3
Tenure 16.6 16.6 17.2 16.3 16.6 15.9 12.9 14.5
% Full time 96.7 84.9 93.0 81.9 91.0 81.3 94.0 69.1
Hourly wage**
t = -1 7.40
(.35)
7.34
(.39)
7.38
(.34)
7.35
(.40)
7.41
(.35)
7.35
(.40)
7.32
(.33)
7.28
(.45)
t 7.50
(.36)
7.39
(.36)
7.48
(.36)
7.37
(.34)
7.54
(.37)
7.43
(.30)
7.49
(.30)
7.55
(.38)
Sample Size 26,839 17,214 9,095 13,913 5,777 12,726 7,690 6,801
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: * Computed at t = -1 for all samples. ** Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 3: Mean attributes for the potential control and treated female groups in time period
t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat.
Demographic variables*
Age 39.6 38.9 42.3 42.9 41.5 41.4 38.8 39.7
Education 9.4 9.0 9.5 9.1 9.8 9.2 10.0 9.2
Tenure 14.1 12.9 16.5 15.4 16.3 15.0 12.7 13.6
% Full time 90.3 80.0 90.6 80.7 88.7 80.3 91.2 67.0
Hourly wage**
t = -1 7.23
(.35)
7.12
(.35)
7.18
(.35)
7.14
(.36)
7.23
(.34)
7.17
(.35)
7.18
(.31)
7.08
(.37)
t 7.30
(.35)
7.18
(.32)
7.31
(.36)
7.16
(.31)
7.37
(.36)
7.26
(.26)
7.32
(.35)
7.34
(.32)
Sample Size 13,738 6,236 5,150 4,967 3,710 4,486 4,814 2,151
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: * Computed at t = -1 for all samples. ** Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 4: Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates of the privatisation impact by gender
time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Groups*
Men −.05
(.003)
−.07
(.004)
−.05
(.005)
.09
(.005)
Women −.01
(.004)
−.10
(.006)
−.04
(.006)
.11
(.008)
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Note: * Standard error in parantheses.
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Table 5: Results from the participation probit for men and women when t = 1
Men Women
Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Constant 3.25* .419 -2.29* .430
Tenure .012* .005 .051* .008
Tenure2 -.001* .000 -.003* .000
Experience -.059* .006 -.050* .006
Experience2 .001* .000 .001* .000
Education (yeas of schooling)a)
Primary (4) 1.871* .307 .631* .093
Preparatory (6) 2.060* .309 .631* .109
Lower secondary (9) 2.282* .319 .976* .121
Upper secondary (11) 1.860* .315 .686* .128
Upper secondary (12) 1.802* .319 .666* .147
Baccalaureate (14) 2.272* .328 1.012* .171
Baccalaureate (15) 1.682* .418 .347 .399
University (16) 2.197* .326 .868* .160
University (17) 1.840* .352 .585* .282
Region
Lisbon and Tagus valley .381* .017 - -
Madeira and Azores -.099* .036 - -
Privatisation date
1991 -.824* .024 -.212* .032
1992 -1.158* .030 -.658* .038
1993 -.261* .032 -.003 .045
1994 .318* .028 .657* .040
1996 -2.189* .039 -1.769* .061
log monthly wage at t = -1 .256* .025 .218* .038
LR chi-squared 13,305 .000** 5,095 .000**
Sample size 44,053 19,974
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Reference group: education: none or less than 4 years of schooling, living in the north of the country and
privatisation occurred in 1989. * denote significant at the 1 percent level.
** P-value for the Likelihood ratio score test for the null hypothesis that all right hand side variables have
no eﬀect on privatisation participation.
a) As a result of the extension of the high school from eleven to twelve years in 1987, the length of higher
education varies.
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Table 6: Other diagnostic tests for the propensity score when t = 1
Test for* Men Women
χ2 (df) P-value χ2 (df) P-value
Non-normality 1 674.908 .000 6.894 .031
Incorrect functional form 4.475 .034 .013 .908
Fraction correctly predicted 73 74
∗The score test suggested by Bera et al.(1984) tests normality against Pearson family distributions and
the functional form test is a modified version of the RESET test of omitted/misspecification test.
Table 7: NN matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on log hourly wage of men
Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Matching version
Simple matching −.095
∗
(.007)
−.093∗
(.012)
.022
(.022)
.023∗
(.010)
Reg. adj. match. −.103
∗
(.005)
−.092∗
(.007)
−.048∗
(.012)
−.048∗
(.006)
DiD matching −.081
∗
(.005)
−.111∗
(.010)
−.014
(.018)
.077∗
(.009)
Reg. adj. DiD match. −.096
∗
(.005)
−.086∗
(.009)
.017∗∗∗
(.013)
.053∗
(.008)
Treated sample size 17, 214 13, 913 12, 726 6, 801
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.* and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1 and 10 percent
levels.
Table 8: NN matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on log hourly wage of women
Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Matching version
Simple matching −.089
∗
(.010)
−.058∗
(.012)
.033∗
(.016)
.067∗∗∗
(.044)
Reg. adj. match. −.101
∗
(.006)
−.071∗
(.008)
−.023∗∗
(.010)
−.062∗∗∗
(.027)
DiD matching −.096
∗
(.008)
−.072∗
(.011)
−.014
(.018)
.033
(.034)
Reg. adj. DiD match. −.093
∗
(.008)
−.053∗
(.011)
−.012
(.013)
−.024
(.030)
Treated sample size 6, 236 4, 967 4, 486 2, 151
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*,** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels.
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Table 9: The impacts of privatisation on the log hourly wage of men
DiD matching Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Age
[18 - 30[ .028
(.041)
−.031
(.082)
.010
(.066)
.109∗
(.042)
[30 - 45[ −.057
∗
(.007)
−.106∗
(.017)
−.014
(.026)
.104∗
(.011)
[45 - 50[ −.010
(.011)
−.140∗
(.023)
−.013
(.029)
.030∗
(.016)
[50 - 65] −.134
∗
(.017)
−.135∗
(.024)
−.023∗
(.040)
.004
(.030)
Tenure
[0 - 5[ .050
(.037)
.012
(.054)
.005
(.048)
.068
(.042)
[5 - 10[ −.009
(.013)
−.065∗
(.043)
−.056
(.051)
.138∗
(.014)
[10 - 20[ −.070
∗
(.008)
−.103∗
(.016)
.034
(.024)
.086∗
(.014)
[20 - [ −.010
(.012)
−.137∗
(.023)
.039
(.038)
.020
(.019)
Education (years of schooling)
[0 - 6] −.072
∗
(.015)
−.078∗
(.016)
.011
(.027)
.085∗
(.019)
]6 -11[ −.070
∗
(.007)
−.101∗
(.010)
.037
(.029)
.079∗
(.010)
[11 - [ −.126
∗
(.024)
−.226∗
(.037)
−.060
(.047)
−.043
(.039)
Occupation
top and other managers −.070
∗
(.014)
−.169∗
(.031)
−.106∗
(.052)
.023
(.024)
foremen and supervisors −.058
∗
(.015)
−.076∗
(.024)
−.024
(.032)
.005
(.030)
low skilled personnel −.087
∗
(.006)
−.118∗
(.012)
.028
(.021)
.086∗
(.009)
Employment status
Full-time −.010
∗
(.005)
−.065
(.007)
.015
(.012)
.005
(.011)
Part-time −.023
(.057)
−.076
(.304)
−.228
(.247)
.314∗
(.083)
Quartil of wage distribution
1 −.026
(.011)
−.008
(.019)
.045∗∗
(.022)
.073∗
(.029)
2 −.027
(.010)
−.105∗
(.032)
.071
(.074)
.067∗
(.017)
3 −.086
∗
(.010)
−.064∗
(.022)
−.003
(.030)
.091∗
(.010)
4 (best paid) −.142
∗
(.018)
−.200∗
(.025)
−.114∗
(.033)
.018
(.021)
Economic cycle
Growth .040
∗
(.006)
−.101∗
(.016)
−.027
(.029)
.107∗
(.009)
Stagnation/recession −.253
∗
(.010)
−.124∗
(.012)
.001
(.015)
−.354∗
(.021)
Treated sample size 17,214 13,913 12,726 6,801
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*,** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels.
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Table 10: The impacts of privatisation on the log hourly wage of women
DiD matching Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Age
[18 - 30[ −.028
(.025)
.090∗∗
(.053)
.052
(.071)
.190∗
(.046)
[30 - 45[ −.096
∗
(.010)
−.100∗
(.017)
−.032∗∗
(.016)
−.007
(.017)
[45 - 50[ −.142
∗
(.025)
−.075∗
(.027)
−.033
(.029)
−.010
(.025)
[50 - 65] −.149
∗
(.031)
−.141∗
(.044)
−.048
(.064)
−.074
(.049)
Tenure
[0 - 5[ −.019
(.028)
−.016
(.050)
.065
(.050)
.091∗∗∗
(.047)
[5 - 10[ −.034
∗
(.013)
−.095∗
(.038)
−.067∗
(.029)
.027
(.039)
[10 - 20[ −.108
∗
(.013)
−.050∗
(.018)
−.014
(.019)
.024
(.020)
[20 - [ −.153
∗
(.019)
−.098∗
(.023)
−.033
(.024)
−.035
(.025)
Education (years of schooling)
[0 - 6] −078
∗
(.016)
−.110∗
(.023)
−.045∗∗
(.022)
−.004
(.027)
]6 -11[ −.101
∗
(.010)
−.114∗
(.015)
−.014
(.019)
.009
(.036)
[11 - [ −.138
∗
(.031)
−.160∗
(.060)
−.053
(.053)
−.002
(.048)
Occupation
top and other managers −.095
∗
(.036)
−.052
(.056)
−.088
(.060)
−.095∗
(.048)
foremen and supervisors −.072
∗
(.027)
−.171∗
(.038)
−.040
(.039)
−.025
(.052)
low skilled personnel −.098
∗
(.008)
−.123∗
(.016)
−.019
(.015)
.022
(.015)
Employment status
Full-time −.120
∗
(.009)
−.056
(.011)
−.040∗
(.014)
−.013
(.014)
Part-time −.005
(.029)
−.223∗∗
(.105)
−.021
(.071)
−.023
(.063)
Quartil of wage distribution
1 −.152
∗
(.015)
−.078∗
(.021)
.016
(.026)
.015
(.030)
2 −.021
(.014)
−.023
(.026)
.091∗
(.039)
.068∗∗
(.032)
3 −.071
∗
(.017)
.074∗
(.038)
.126∗
(.035)
.045
(.102)
4 (best paid) −.213
∗
(.024)
−.096∗
(.030)
−.057∗∗∗
(.032)
.008
(.022)
Economic cycle
Growth .015
∗
(.008)
−.040∗
(.015)
−.018
(.023)
.052∗∗
(.024)
Stagnation/recession −.260
∗
(.015)
−.078∗
(.021)
−.022
(.013)
−.032∗
(.013)
Treated sample size 6,236 4,967 4,486 2,152
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*,** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and
10 percent levels.
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